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Abstract
This note discusses the impact of collection sales (i.e., the bundling of several
journals for sale by publishers to libraries) on journals. The advent of electronic
journal distribution implies that bundling is an efficient sales strategy, and can act
to extend the reach of a journal. Current arrangements are discussed and shown to
lead to tensions between commercial publishers and non-profit journals. The note
argues that non-profit journals should not abandon their participation in collection
sales programmes. Rather, non-profit journals may benefit from withdrawing from
commercial publishers which distribute their own for-profit journals, and from
joining together to be distributed by less commercial publishers who set relatively
low prices for their collections.
Keywords: Journal pricing; bundling; price discrimination.
JEL classification: D82, L31, L42, L82.
1 Introduction
Publishers perform several valuable tasks which an academic journal cannot usually do
well on its own, such as marketing, negotiations with libraries, maintaining a website,
and so on. When it acts for several journals, one function a publisher can perform is
bundling. In this note I discuss the pros and cons of bundling journals for sale to libraries
(or “collection sales”). The perspective is very much that of an individual journal, rather
than overall welfare. For instance, bundling may be used as a vehicle for exclusion of new
∗I am grateful to Ted Bergstrom, Carli Coetzee, Richard Gedye, Martin Green, Jim Hosek and Chris
Wallace for helpful comments. All remaining errors and views are my own responsibility.
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journals or rival publishers, but this is not discussed here.1 In particular, the concern
about possible high bundle prices from publishers in this note is only that a journal’s
reach may not be as large as it desires, rather than that libraries may be exploited.
Library expenditure on scientific journals has significantly increased in recent years.2
This has been the result of two main factors: significant merger activity among publish-
ers, and the increased use of bundling as a marketing device as facilitated by the elec-
tronic distribution of journals. Regarding the former, Dewatripont, Ginsburgh, Legros,
and Walckiers (2007) show that journal prices tend to be higher in those scientific fields
where publishers are more concentrated. However, this note focuses on the second rea-
son for inflation in library expenditure. The introduction of bundling as a business
model is a powerful force for price rises, especially when combined with a concentrated
market structure in which publishers each distribute many journals. When a publisher
distributes many journals, packaging these journals as a bundle acts significantly to re-
duce the dispersion of libraries’ willingness-to-pay for the bundle compared with their
willingness-to-pay for individual journals. This reduces the asymmetry of information
between publisher and library, which has two effects: first, it means that more libraries
will gain access to a given journal (a positive efficiency effect), and second, the publisher
will better be able to extract a library’s willingness-to-pay for the bundle (a monopoly
exploitation effect). It is quite possible that bundling acts to improve overall welfare,
but transfers surplus from libraries to publishers (and then possibly onto the journals
themselves).3
Journals differ in their form of ownership and their objectives. In this note, I say that
a journal is “for-profit” if it aims only to maximize its profit. Usually, such journals are
owned by commercial publishers. The main alternative discussed here is that of “non-
1See Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) and Jeon and Menicucci (2006) for discussion of these wider issues
in the context of journal publishing, and Armstrong (2008) for a general overview of the possible anti-
competitive impacts of bundling.
2Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) report that during the period 1984—2001 the price of library subscriptions
to periodicals in law, medicine and physics rose respectively by 205%, 479% and 615%. (Overall inflation
in the United States was 70% over this period.) However, the advent of widespread bundling has meant
that library expenditure per journal has fallen from a peak in 2000. See page 13 in the Association of
Research Libraries’ ARL Statistics 2005-06 (published 2008, Washington, DC.).
3The impact of bundling many products is parallel to so-called first-degree price discrimination.
The textbook monopolist of widgets sets price above marginal cost because it does not have accurate
information about its buyers’ willingness-to-pay for its product. The result is that demand is inefficiently
restricted but buyers are left with some surplus. If the monopolist had accurate information about each
buyer’s willingness-to-pay, it would charge each buyer her reservation price, with the result that demand
is expanded to the efficient level but buyers are left with none of the gains from trade.
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profit” journals, which are assumed instead to wish to maximize their “reach” subject
to a break-even constraint.4 (Reach can be measured in various ways, but in this note
we take it to be the number of libraries which have access to the journal.) Such journals
are usually owned independently of commercial publishers, or owned by less commercial
publishers (such as some university presses). In practice, the line between for-profit and
non-profit journals is not always so easy to draw. For instance, a journal which does
not have profit as its ultimate objective may benefit when it receives more revenue, as a
better-financed journal may end up publishing better articles (for instance, by being more
efficient at processing submissions or by paying authors when they publish a paper in the
journal), and this may maximize its reach or impact in the long term.5 Nevertheless, in
the formal model in this paper I ignore these subtleties, and suppose that journals are
exogenously partitioned into for-profit and non-profit journals.
Subscription prices can vary hugely between these two kinds of journal. Bergstrom
(2001) reports that in 2000 the six most-cited economics journals were all non-profit
journals, and their (stand-alone) library subscription prices were then an average of
$180. Five of the top 20 most-cited journals were owned by commercial publishers, and
their average subscription price was then $1660 per year.6
4A third kind of journal, related to the non-profit journals, is the category of society journals.
Perhaps the main difference between a society journal and other non-profit journals is that the former
may wish to ensure there is still a market for personal journal subscriptions, since this historically has
been a major reason why people become members of the society. (Other methods are requiring society
membership to submit articles or to attend an annual conference.) A wholehearted bundling policy —
where essentially all potential members can electronically access the journal for free via their library —
would be likely to decimate personal subscriptions and so reduce society membership. Thus, all else
equal, a society journal is more likely to be suspicious of bundling policies. Of course, the same point
applies also to site licenses for a single journal (where all members of an institution can electronically
access the journal when the library has a subscription), but less strongly. With a site license, a journal
will lose most of its personal subscribers at subscribing institutions, but with bundling as well it will
lose most of its personal subscribers at those institutions which take the collection (as well as those at
institutions with full library subscriptions).
5This note does not address why journals have the aims they do. To do this, we would need to
model the author side of the market as well. Authors, all else equal, prefer a wide-reaching journal to
one with more limited readership. This may be because they like the idea of many people reading their
paper, or because wide-reaching journal is typically a prestigious journal. (More readers will, all else
equal, result in more citations and a higher impact factor. And of course causation goes the other way
too, and readers are more likely to read prestigious journals.) Thus, a journal’s ultimate aim may be to
publish the “best papers”, and the way to attract to best papers is to have a wide readership. See Jeon
and Rochet (2007) for more detailed discussion about how journal pricing (both to institutions and to
submitting authors) and the quality of articles interact.
6See Dewatripont, Ginsburgh, Legros, and Walckiers (2007) for more recent data for a much wider
range of scientific disciplines, which also shows that for-profit journals typically are significantly more
expensive than non-profit journals.
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The rest of the note goes as follows. In the next section, I discuss current arrange-
ments for collections sales, and how this system leads to various tensions for non-profit
journals. In section 3, some of the options for the future of journal pricing and remuner-
ation are discussed. In section 4 a formal model is presented in an attempt to analyze
the long-run evolution of the market. Here, bundling is assumed to be widespread and
publishers are assumed to compete for journals along two dimensions: the revenue they
offer journals and the reach of their collection to libraries. For-profit journals care only
about the former dimension, while non-profit journals care only about the latter (as long
as they receive enough revenue to cover their fixed costs). Publishers are assumed to
make lump-sum payments to attract journals, as opposed to current arrangements which
are a messy compromise between stand-alone subscription payments and ad hoc revenue
allocations from collection sales. In this framework, all journals prefer to participate in
collection sales programmes, but the two kinds of journals are distributed by publishers
with different (induced) pricing strategies: for-profit journals are attracted to (or are
owned by) publishers who offer them high revenue but relatively low reach, while non-
profit journals go to publishers who market their collections with relatively low prices
and high reach.
2 Tensions in Current Publishing Arrangements
There are a number of methods for pricing institutional subscriptions and remunerating
journals. Historically, all journals were disseminated only in hard copy and bundling
was not significantly used.7 The result was an extremely simple and transparent process
for setting subscription prices and allocating revenue to journals. Each journal sets the
price a library must pay to subscribe to the journal, regardless of which other journals
the library buys. (There may be some explicit price discrimination, say to developing
countries.) An independent journal typically has the authority to set its subscription
price (with the advice of the publisher), and so the journal has full control over its reach
and revenue. For non-profit journals we expect to see the quality of the journal being
inversely related to its stand-alone subscription price, at least so long as the fixed cost
of running a journal does not vary much with quality.8 An important feature of this
7Of course, though, a journal can itself be regarded as a bundle of individual articles.
8Suppose a high-quality journal has library demand QH(p) with subscription price p, while a lower-
quality journal has demand QL(p) < QH(p). If both have the same fixed cost of operation, then
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“non-bundled” market is that a journal does not really care about which other journals
its publisher markets, or how it markets them. So long as its publisher performs its
marketing tasks diligently and offers a competitive rate for its services, a journal (for-
profit or non-profit) is indifferent about its publisher’s interactions with other journals
since that has no impact on libraries’ decisions about whether to subscribe.
However, the move to electronic distribution of journals makes bundling an efficient
and profitable strategy. Since it costs virtually nothing for a publisher to supply a library
with an extra journal, a publisher will wish to strike a deal with a library to take all the
journals to which it does not already have full subscriptions. Current publishing arrange-
ments are a somewhat messy mixture of stand-alone full subscriptions and “top-up fees”
for the right to access electronically the remaining journals in the collection. In more
detail, a publisher obviously knows which libraries have full institutional subscriptions to
its various journals. The publisher may then offer a library access to all the publisher’s
additional journals (to which the library does not currently subscribe) for an additional
top-up fee.9 Thus, a journal to which the library already subscribes continues to receive
its subscription fee, plus a share (to be discussed) of the top-up fee. Similarly, if a library
has not recently subscribed to the journal, the publisher may persuade the library to
take its whole bundle of journals, in which case the library will then have access to the
journal and the journal will receive just its share of the top-up fee.
There are a number of concerns with this arrangement: First, there is a limit to
how long this system can work: why should a library’s subscription decisions from many
years ago determine how much it should pay for a publisher’s collection of journals?
Second, and relatedly, a publisher may have a difficult job policing this arrangement.
What if a library cancels its stand-alone subscription to a journal (as it obviously has
every right to do), but then next year has access to the journal as part of its top-up
bundle? Publishers claim they can pursuade libraries not to do this. For instance, if a
library cancels one full subscription the publisher can threaten to increase its top-up fee
by the corresponding amount the next year. However, there are two problems with this
the high-quality journal can set a lower break-even price than the lower-quality journal. The impact
of quality on for-profit journal prices is less clear-cut, since the impact of a demand expansion on a
monopolist’s price is ambiguous (without further assumptions on demand elasticity and the nature of
the demand expansion).
9See section B3 in Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) for more details of Elsevier’s various 2002 bundling
offers to libraries.
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policy:
• If the (commercial) publisher has the ability to increase the top-up fee, we expect
that it would do this in any case. Relatedly, it might not be credible for the
publisher to promise to keep the overall charge for the collection unchanged if
a library ceases a full subscription to a journal in the collection. For instance,
suppose the library originally placed a value v on having access to a particular
journal, while the full subscription price for this journal is p. Originally, v > p
and the library decided it was worthwhile subscribing. But now for some reason
the value v falls below p, and the library decides to cancel its subscription. If the
publisher is confident the library is willing to bear a price rise of p in the top-up
fee, it seems it could have increased the price of the top-up fee before v declined.
If not, then the library might cease subscribing to the whole collection when faced
with the price rise, which the publisher would not wish to risk.
• Carrying out this threat may benefit the publisher (via its own journals in the
collection) rather than the cancelled journal itself. Indeed, for this reason the
publisher may have an incentive to allow libraries to cancel full subscriptions to
independent journals and to load more of the total charge onto the top-up fee.
It is difficult to find public data to see whether journals in collection sales have better or
worse institutional renewal rates than those which choose to be sold outside a publisher’s
collection.10 But in any event a journal can only trust that its publisher is doing its best
to maintain its base of historical subscriptions, against each library’s obvious incentive
to exploit bundling discounts (and the publisher’s possible incentive to load more onto
the top-up fee).
Third, for as long as this arrangement persists, it is virtually impossible for a journal
to secure a new full library subscription. (Such a library will surely ask for the journal
as part of the top-up package.) Thus, once a subscription has been lost, it will not come
back. In addition, in a new market such as China, where there are historically few full
10One data-point is Econometrica’s institutional subscription figures–see Table 1 in “Report of the
Secretary” (2007), Econometrica, 75(1), page 292. Here it is reported that, starting from a base of 2438,
the journal lost 124 institutional subscribers in the year leading up to the end of 2001, 93 in 2002, 3
in 2003, 189 in 2004 and 80 in 2005. The journal was sold as part of Blackwell’s collection only in the
single year 2004, which is when it incurred its largest subscriber loss. However, there is so much noise
in this time series that it is hard to conclude much from this with confidence.
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subscriptions, a journal will be unable to generate many full subscriptions. Of course,
for a really new institution the top-up fee for the bundle of all journals may be much
larger than for an older library with many historical institutional subscriptions. In this
case, the thorny issue of how the top-fee for the bundle is allocated among journals (see
the next point) becomes all the more important.
Fourth, how should the top-up fee be allocated between journals? If a publisher’s
journals are fairly homogenous, then it does not seem unreasonable to divide the fee
equally. (E.g., Elsevier’s Handbooks in Economics currently all have the same price, and
revenues from bundled electronic dissemination are allocated equally to all books.) But
usually there is significant journal heterogeneity in terms of (i) subscription fees, (ii)
impact and prestige, (iii) whether the journal is independent or owned by the publisher,
and (iv) the number of historic full subscriptions to the journal. A common arrangement
is that the top-up fee is allocated in proportion to the journal’s stand-alone subscription
fee. This arrangement is troubling for a number of reasons:
• A publisher has an incentive to start its own low-quality journals, and to set a very
high subscription fee for these. Few libraries would choose to have stand-alone
subscriptions to such a journal, but the publisher will syphon off a large fraction
of the top-up fee merely as a result of having these journals in its collection.
• Independent journals then have an extra incentive to raise their subscription fees,
purely in order to obtain a larger slice of the top-up fee, which could lead to
inflationary pressure in the market.
• There is little evidence of positive correlation between a journal’s subscription price
and the quality of a journal in the collection — if anything, the reverse.11
11A look at Wiley-Blackwell’s website Synergy (visited on September 17, 2007) yields the following
data for economics journals: Agricultural Economics has impact factor 0.584 and subscription fee £364;
Contemporary Economic Policy has impact 0.444 and subscription £151; Econometrica has impact 2.402
and subscription £278; Economic Journal has impact 1.629 and subscription £336; Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy has impact 1.0 and subscription £217; Journal of Economic Surveys has
impact 0.75 and subscription £410; Journal of Industrial Economics has impact 1.152 and subscription
£146; Kyklos has impact 0.627 and subscription £303, and Review of Economic Studies has impact
2.0 and subscription £204. (Subscription fees are the “online only” institutional subscription fee in the
UK for the 2007 volume.) For further discussion of this point, see Bergstrom (2001) and Dewatripont,
Ginsburgh, Legros, and Walckiers (2007).
Note, though, that impact factor is not the best measure of a library’s willingness-to-pay for a journal,
since it expresses a journal’s impact on a per-article basis. A better measure would be impact factor
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Note that in established regions, where a journal historically has good reach, this injustice
is not as great as it may at first appear (at least in the short run). For so long as the
publisher is adequately policing the renewals of its institutional subscribers (the second
point above), the journal will be receiving its full institutional subscription fee in any
case, plus a small top up. For instance, consider a simple world in which there are two
kinds of journal: the top tier, which all relevant libraries subscribe to on an individual
basis, and a lower tier, to which all libraries consume only as part of a bundled package.
In such a situation, the top tier journals do not drive the demand for the top-up bundle,
and it is not clear why they should receive any of the top-up fee. Any revenue which
a top-tier journal receives from the top-up fee might be regarded as being “paid twice”
for the subscription. Nevertheless, the number of full library subscriptions is likely to
continue falling (despite the publishers’ claimed best efforts to stop this). In future,
therefore, the top-up fee is sure to be an ever larger fraction of even a top-tier journal’s
revenue, and this allocation issue will assume ever greater importance. Moreover, in new
regions where libraries are starting from scratch, this issue is important right now. An
important point is that an allocation rule for a “top-up” fee which is broadly acceptable to
an established journal in a mature market may not be remotely acceptable for allocating
revenues from an entirely new institution, yet some publishers currently apply the same
rule in both situations.
Finally, current arrangements leave independent journals with relatively little control
over their reach and revenues. In contrast to the previous regime of stand-alone journal
sales, where a journal knew exactly how much it would receive from each subscribing
institution, a journal is now left to the mercy of a publisher in its (private) negotiations
with libraries. If a publisher claims to have struck a good deal to supply a consortia of,
say, Chinese universities, the journals in its collection have to take that at face value
(even if they accept the publisher’s rule for how it divides collection revenue).
3 Possible Future Arrangements
For all of these various reasons, it is hard to imagine how current arrangements can persist
for long, and the industry will move to some other method (or methods) for remunerating
multiplied by the number of articles per year. See the useful website www.eigenfactor.org for rankings
of journals in terms of (improved) measures of per-article impact, total impact, and cost-effectiveness.
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journals. Some journals have reacted to these current tensions simply by reverting to
the historical system of stand-alone pricing and distribution, and ceasing to be included
in their publisher’s collection sales programme. Such a response has some advantages:
it eliminates the danger of the journal cross-subsidizing the publisher’s own second-rate
journals, and it gives the journal full control over the price libraries pay. However, it also
eliminates all efficiency gains from the use of bundling. (These efficiency gains, which
can be dramatic, are described in more detail in section 4.) For this reason, this response
cannot easily be recommended.
Alternatives which are more in the way of incremental adjustments to current arrange-
ments include:
• Dividing the top-up fee on the basis of, say, impact factor (multiplied by the number
of articles per year–see footnote 10) instead of the subscription fee. This would
largely remove the danger of cross-subsidy from prestigious non-profit journals to
the publisher’s own less good journals. However, in mature markets at least, there
is real danger of the prestigious journals being “paid twice”.
• Dividing the top-up fee on the basis of “usage” (say, the number of downloads of
the journal at all institutions).
• Specifying a larger payment (e.g., £50, as opposed to something like £5 or less
under typical current arrangements) a journal receives if it is included in a bundle
for a library which did not previously subscribe. In such cases, libraries would
probably have to have the right to opt out of receiving the journal within the
collection. Such a system is far from transparent, however, and involves complex
calculations for how important a particular journal is in a publisher’s collection.
• Implementing distinct allocation rules in mature markets and emerging markets.
Thus, in mature markets, established prestigious journals already receive the rev-
enue from their historical full subscriptions, and for them the details of how the
relatively small top-up fee is allocated are not so important. But in new markets,
prestigious journals should receive an allocation of the collection fee which reflects
their importance in the collection (and not in proportion to their individual library
subscription rate, which has little relevance in the new market).
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More radical arrangements are also possible to imagine. Many people have suggested
than an “open access” model is the best way for the market to evolve, and that journals
should not charge for access at all, but should cover their fixed costs by levying fees on
published authors. This idea has some attractions: if electronic access to journals is free
then the whole vexed issue of bundling goes away; and clearly open access journals have
the widest conceivable reach. But the debate about open access is sometimes confused
between the normative and the positive. While some people might want the market
to move in this direction, this might just be wishful thinking unless there are reasons
to think that there are underlying forces pushing in this direction. For one example
for why the open access model might not be sustainable, consider the likely size of the
author fee needed to allow journals to break even. A journal with operating costs of, say,
£300,000 per year which publishes 50 articles per year would need to levy a publication
fee of £6,000 per article. It seems plausible that fees of this magnitude could deter
some people from publishing their research, which is a market failure arguably worse
than that involved in some people not being able to read published research. Moreover,
many journals may be tempted to accept more articles than they otherwise would in
order to receive this substantial payment, with a result that quality could fall relative
to a “reader pays” business model. While the open access model may work for some
journals, it seems far-fetched that it will become universal in the market in the medium
term (at least without major external pressure from some source).12
The remaining alternative considered in this paper is the widespread use of collection
sales but without using historical data on library subscriptions. As is clear from the
discussion so far, once bundling is involved, it is hard to establish (i) a journal’s contri-
bution to the overall demand for the collection and (ii) how to determine the price for the
collection as a whole. Instead of using data on past stand-alone subscriptions, publishers
could compete to offer an independent journal an annual fixed payment for the right to
market the journal as the publisher sees fit. Such an arrangement bypasses the allocation
issue altogether, and it gives journals no explicit control over the total charge for the
bundle. Implicit in this method is a promise from the publisher to attain a specified
reach for its bundle. While for-profit journals do not care about reach, non-profit jour-
nals will need to consider both the publisher’s remuneration and reach when choosing its
12See McCabe and Snyder (2007) and Jeon and Rochet (2007), and the references contained therein,
for further discussion of the impact of the open access model and the likelihood of it emerging.
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publisher. This arrangement is hardly ever seen now, but it is surely a good candidate
for the long run norm in the industry as pure bundling becomes commonplace. The
outcome would be different for profit-maximizing journals and for non-profit journals.
We expect to see two kinds of publisher in this market: “commercial publishers” aiming
to serve for-profit journals and less commercial publishers (perhaps university presses,
and so on) aiming to serve the non-profit journals. Commercial publishers would set
a profit-maximizing bundle price to libraries, and then pay this back to their journals
in proportion to their value in the bundle. Less commercial publishers would charge a
lower bundle price which just allows their journals to break even but which expands their
reach. I present a stylized model of such a market in the next section.
4 A Model of Collection Sales
In this section I provide a model of collection sales and of how the market might evolve
once the current transitional arrangements have ceased.13 The model presumes that
bundling is the norm (as is efficient with electronic dissemination), that historic records
of which libraries used to have full subscriptions are irrelevant, that publishers pay lump-
sum fees to journals for the right to market their journals, and that publishers charge
libraries a lump-sum fee for the right to access their entire collections of journals.
Suppose the various journals are indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., N , and that a particular
library is willing to pay vi to obtain access to journal i.
14 Journals are assumed not
to substitute for each other, and a library’s willingness-to-pay for one journal is unaf-
fected by which other journals it buys. That is to say, if the library has access to the
set of I journals, its total willingness-to-pay for the collection is ∑i∈I vi. We assume
that publishers cannot observe a particular library’s list of valuations (v1, ..., vN) but
they know the distribution of (v1, ..., vN) in the population of libraries. Suppose that
libraries are not budget constrained, and can afford to buy any journal for a price up
13Related analysis is found in Bergstrom and Bergstrom (2004). Their interest is in the situation
where a single journal is sold to many readers (via a site license), unlike my focus which is on selling
many journals to a single “reader” (the library). However, in economic terms the analysis of the two
situations is almost identical. In addition, their focus is more on the impact of bundling arrangements
on the welfare of readers, while here only the interests of journals are discussed.
14With the advent of electronic distribution, an institution’s value for a journal is more accurately
known than in the print era (when rarely-answered questionnaires were sent around to faculty and
students to gauge their need for the journal), since the number of downloads from a journal can be
monitored.
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to its willingness-to-pay, vi.
15 Also, suppose the marginal cost of supplying a journal
to an additional library is zero, and the costs in the publishing layer of the market are
normalized to zero.
In this model we expect to see two kinds of publisher emerge in order to cater to
the different aims of the two kinds of journals: commercial publishers will cater to (or
own) for-profit journals, and concentrate their efforts on extracting as much revenue as
possible from libraries; “non-profit” publishers will attract the non-profit journals by
setting a low subscription price for their collections (but enough to cover the journals’
costs) and thereby enhance their reach.
I divide the analysis into two parts. First, I focus on the case where all libraries
have a similar willingness-to-pay for large bundles of journals (even though they may
have very different demands for individual journals). In this situation, it turns out that
journals do not face a meaningful trade-off between revenue and reach. Second, I discuss
the more realistic situation in which libraries differ systematically in their demand for
bundles of journals, in which case a journal must decide whether to sacrifice revenue for
greater readership.
4.1 Similar Libraries
For the sake of simplicity consider the case where each vi is independently and uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1]. We discuss the cases of stand-alone journal pricing and
bundling in turn.
Stand-alone pricing: Consider the case of a for-profit journal. Without bundling, the
optimal price for such a journal maximizes p(1−p), i.e., p = 1
2
is the subscription charge
for a stand-alone journal. The profit to be shared between the journal and the publisher
is 1
4
, and the journal sells to 50% of libraries. If the publisher market is competitive, all
that profit goes to the journal and the outcome is just as if the journal sold directly to
libraries (e.g., via its own website), so long as the journal was equally good as a publisher
at marketing activities. For a non-profit journal, the non-bundled price which just covers
its fixed cost will obviously depend on that fixed cost: for example, if the fixed cost is
15Clearly this is a significant simplification. If a library faces an exogenous and ad hoc budget
constraint, journals will have to compete with each other to be purchased, even if they are not substitutes
in the library’s “utility function”. See Nevo, Rubinfeld, and McCabe (2005) and Jeon and Menicucci
(2006) for analysis of this point.
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k = 1
10
, the lowest break-even price is p ≈ 0.11, and so this non-profit journal reaches
89% of libraries.
Bundling two journals: Turning next to bundling arrangements, suppose first that a
publisher distributes just two journals.16 Suppose that the publisher charges libraries a
price pi for subscribing to journal i on its own, and the price p12 for subscribing to the
collection of both journals. Then, under the realistic assumption that there is a discount
for consuming the bundle (i.e., p12 ≤ p1 + p2), the pattern of library demand for the
publisher’s journals is as depicted on Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Pattern of Library Subscriptions with Mixed Bundling
When these journals are for-profit, the publisher will aim to maximize the profit from
marketing these journals. Brute-force calculations using the areas of the various regions
on Figure 1 show that the most profitable way to sell these journals to libraries is “mixed
bundling” of the form:
p1 = p2 =
2
3
; p12 =
4
3
−
√
2
3
≈ 0.86 .
Thus the price for a single journal rises relative to the situation with stand-alone pricing
16This discussion of two-product bundling is taken from sections 12.5 and 12.8.2 in Armstrong (2008).
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(where the price was 1
2
), while the total price for the bundle falls. Bundling generates
total profit of approximately 0.55, so that the incremental profit for the “second” journal
is 0.3, instead of 0.25 with stand-alone pricing. One can show that each journal now
sells to more than 60% of libraries (compared to 50% with stand-alone pricing), and so
bundling acts to expand the reach of these journals (even though these for-profit journals
do not care about their reach).17
Suppose instead that the journals are non-profit, so that the publisher chooses its
pricing policy to maximize the journals’ reach, subject to allowing the journals to cover
their fixed cost, say k, for each journal. In this example at least, it turns out that
pure bundling is optimal, and the journals are not made available individually. Again,
the price for the bundle depends on the size of k. For instance, if k = 1
10
, the bundle
price for the two journals is approximately 0.2 and the collection’s reach is about 98%.
Thus, bundling again acts to boost the reach of a journal. (With stand-alone pricing
and k = 1
10
, a non-profit journal reached 89% of libraries.) Of course, it is generally true
that bundling can expand the reach of a non-profit journal, since it adds to the range
of pricing instruments which could be employed: the publisher could sell its journals
without bundling, but except in knife-edge cases it can do strictly better with a degree
of bundling. (The only case in which bundling cannot do better is when a library’s
willingness-to-pay for one journal is perfectly correlated with that for the other.)
Bundling many journals: One can, with difficulty, calculate the precisely optimal mixed
bundling tariff if the publisher has three journals to distribute, while four or more journals
seems close to intractable. It is technically much easier, and not too unrealistic, to
suppose a publisher has “many” journals, and thereby invoke the law of large numbers.18
When a collection consists of many journals, a library’s willingness-to-pay for n journals is
tightly distributed around the expected willingness-to-pay, 1
2
n, so that the great majority
of libraries will have
∑
i vij ≈ 12n. For simplicity, suppose each library’s willingness-to-
17In this example, the aggregate surplus of libraries also increases (slightly) when bundling is employed,
although those libraries which have little interest in one of the journals are worse off since the stand-alone
price rises.
18See Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) for details of this analysis. It is impor-
tant to remember that it is a publisher’s entire collection of journals which is usually relevant for an
institution’s decision to subscribe, not, say, just the number or quality of its economics journals. At
the time of writing, for instance, Wiley-Blackwell distributes more than 1400 academic journals and
Elsevier distributes more than 2300.
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pay is exactly 1
2
n for a bundle of n journals.
Consider first a publisher which distributes a collection of n for-profit journals. If n
is large, the publisher should therefore set the pure bundle price:
price for collection of n journals = 1
2
n . (1)
All libraries will just be willing to pay this, with the result that each journal is available
in all libraries (in contrast to the non-bundling situation, where a for-profit journal was
taken by just half the libraries). In a competitive publisher market each journal will re-
ceive its contribution to the collection revenue, i.e., it will receive the incremental profit
1
2
(in contrast to the situation with stand-alone pricing, where a for-profit journal obtains
just 1
4
). This incremental profit is equal to aggregate willingness-to-pay of all libraries, so
that it is just as if the journal (or publisher) could engage in first-degree price discrimina-
tion between libraries. In effect, when a library’s value for one journal is independent of
its value for other journals, bundling with large numbers of journals eradicates a library’s
private information about its willingness-to-pay. Commercial publishers here extract the
entire surplus of libraries. (This contrasts with the previous two-journal example where
bundling made the libraries better off.) This example serves to demonstrate the very
considerable potential benefits of collection sales in terms of enhancing a for-profit jour-
nal’s (i) reach (which doubles in this example relative to stand-alone pricing) and (ii)
revenue (which also doubles).
Consider next the case of non-profit journals. As long as the publisher sets its collec-
tion price below that in (1), each library is willing to take the collection. In particular,
a non-profit journal benefits from enhanced reach when bundling is employed. (In this
example with k = 1
10
, when bundling is used a non-profit journal’s reach expands from
89% to 100% coverage, although almost all of this circulation gain is obtained when just
two journals are bundled.) Thus, regardless of whether it is for-profit or non-profit, a
journal benefits from bundling. An artificial feature of this model is that library demand
for a collection of n journals is essentially inelastic up to the choke price (1). As such,
non-profit (and for-profit) journals do not face a meaningful trade-off between the rev-
enue they receive and their reach. Therefore, the precise price charged for the collection
will depend heavily on whether non-profit journals place any weight on the welfare of
libraries (in which case they would set a low price for the collection which just covers the
journal’s costs), or whether greater revenue for the journal acts to improve the journal’s
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performance (which might make the journals set a high price for the collection, since it
does not impact on their reach). A more sensible model where there is a real trade-off
between revenue and reach is presented in section 4.2.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that with large numbers of journals, this analysis
works just as neatly when journals differ in their perceived quality. Thus, if a library’s
willingness-to-pay for journal i comes from some distribution function Fi(·) with mean
µi, say (where the distribution for vi is independent of the distribution for vj) then a
library’s willingness-to-pay for collection I is now approximately∑i∈I µi. In the case of
for-profit journals, when the publishing market is competitive, journal i will be paid the
entire area under its demand curve (µi =
∫
(1− Fi)dv) to be included in the collection.
Further remarks: When each vi is independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1], this
discussion shows that if a for-profit journal is sold on its own it generates profit 0.25, if
it sold with one other journal it generates incremental profit 0.3, and if it is sold as a
bundle with many journals it generates incremental profit 0.5. Although I have not cal-
culated the incremental profit for other finite collections (with 3, 4, ... journals), it seems
plausible that a journal’s incremental profit contribution to a collection is increasing in
the number of other journals, with limit 0.5. Thus, a publisher with a greater number of
other journals will be prepared to pay more to attract an additional journal than a pub-
lisher with fewer existing journals. Thus, in this model, the publishing market exhibits a
natural tendency towards a concentrated market structure, with large publishers better
able to attract further journals than smaller publishers. A similar point applies to com-
petition for non-profit journals: a publisher with a greater number of other journals will
be able to offer greater reach to a journal than a publisher with fewer existing journals.
It is possible that a ‘niche’ journal (either for-profit or non-profit) with low overall
demand from libraries would not be able to cover its fixed cost in a world without
bundling, and so would not be supplied. But the extra revenue generated with bundling
may allow cost-recovery. Thus, it is possible that the use of bundling leads to the
introduction of new, smaller, journals. (This effect is quite distinct from the possibility,
discussed in section 2, that with bundling publishers may introduce spurious low-value
journals in order to boost their share of the top-up fee.) This observation is an instance
of the general point that price discrimination can act to open markets which would not
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otherwise be served.
4.2 Heterogeneous Libraries
In the analysis of the previous section, a publisher which bundles together many journals
in its collection does not face a trade-off between its reach and the price of its collection.
Since this seems unrealistic, consider the following extended framework.19
Suppose that libraries differ systematically in their willingness-to-pay for collections
of journals, captured by the parameter θ. (This parameter might reflect the size of the
institution, its degree of research-orientation, or its wealth.) In more detail, a library’s
willingness-to-pay for journal i is vi = θwi, and if the library subscribes to journal collec-
tion I, its total willingness-to-pay for the bundle is θ∑i∈I wi, so that θ shifts a library’s
willingness-to-pay multiplicatively. Even if wi and wj are independently distributed, vi
and vj are now positively correlated via the common factor θ. Suppose that θ is dis-
tributed throughout the population of libraries with the distribution function G(θ), and
that the N + 1 parameters θ, w1, ..., wN are independently distributed. Since it is not
much harder to do the asymmetric journal case, suppose that each library’s preference
parameter wi for journal i is drawn from the distribution function Fi(w), with mean µi.
As before, assume that a publisher distributes many journals, so that a library’s
willingness-to-pay for the collection I is approximately equal to the average willingness-
to-pay:
θ
∑
i∈I
wi ≈ θ
∑
i∈I
µi .
Because the parameter θ remains private information to a library, publishers can no
longer accurately predict a library’s willingness-to-pay for even a large collection. In
particular, commercial publisher cannot fully extract library surplus.
What is the optimal strategy for a commercial publisher who distributes a large
number of for-profit journals? If a publisher has the set of I journals and sets the
collection price P , the marginal library type which subscribes has θ such that θ
∑
i∈I µi =
P . Therefore, if it chooses to make θ the marginal library, the revenue generated from
the collection is
(1−G(θ))× P = (1−G(θ))×
(
θ
∑
i∈I
µi
)
.
19See section 3 of Armstrong (1999) for more details.
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Therefore, regardless of its list of journals, it will chose θ∗ to maximize (1−G(θ))θ. Each
of its journals will then (in a competitive market) receive its incremental contribution
to the bundle revenue, so that journal i will be paid (1 − G(θ∗))θ∗µi. Notice that a
profit-maximizing journal does not care about the quality of the other journals in the
same collection (as represented by the other journals’ µj), since that does not affect its
remuneration.
Next, consider competition for non-profit journals. For these journals, a publisher
will aim to maximize the reach of its collection (i.e., minimize the marginal library type
θ), while covering its journals’ fixed costs. It is clear that journals of (approximately)
the same quality (as represented by µ), will group together with a publisher, and higher
quality journals will have a greater reach.20 To see this, suppose that a publisher has
100 high-quality journals with µ = 3 and 100 lesser-quality journals with µ = 2, so that
the value of this collection to a type-θ library is 500 × θ. If each journal’s fixed cost is
k, then the publisher must ensure that
500(1−G(θ))θ ≥ 200k ,
and it will choose the smallest θ which satisfies this break even constraint. But if another
publisher “poached” the 100 high-quality journals and offered libraries this high-quality
bundle (worth 300× θ to the type-θ library), its break even constraint is relaxed to
300(1−G(θ))θ ≥ 100k .
Thus this rival publisher can offer the high-quality journals an expanded reach, while
still covering their costs, relative to the initial case. Thus, just as with the historic case
of non-bundled distribution, higher quality journals have lower per-journal prices and
greater reach. Nevertheless, bundling leads to greater reach for a non-profit journal of
any given quality than does stand-alone pricing.
To illustrate this discussion, suppose each wi is independently and uniformly distrib-
uted on [0, 1], so all journals have the same quality, and suppose that θ is also uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose a journal’s fixed cost is k = 1
20
. Then the commercial
publishers, catering to for-profit journals, will choose θ∗ to maximize θ(1− θ) and so sell
to 50% of libraries, and give each of its journals the revenue 1
8
(well in excess of their
20More generally, if cost differs across journals, journals with the same quality/cost ratio µ/k will be
distributed together.
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costs). By contrast, in the historic stand-alone pricing regime, a for-profit journal in this
environment would set the subscription price p ≈ 0.28, which is attractive to just 36%
of libraries. Therefore, each such journal will obtain revenue of around 0.1.21
A publisher catering to non-profit journals will choose the marginal subscribing li-
brary to have the smallest parameter θ which satisfies the break even constraint
1
2
θ(1− θ) = 1
20
,
which entails selling the collection to about 89% of libraries. With stand-alone prices, a
non-profit journal will set a subscription price of p ≈ 0.06, which is attractive to around
77% of libraries. To summarise this example from the viewpoint of a non-profit journal:
• Without bundling, the journal can cover its costs by selling to 77% of libraries.
• With bundling, provided the journal uses a “non-commercial” publisher, it can
cover its costs and increase its reach to 89% of libraries
• However, if the journal is included in the collection of a commercial publisher
which normally deals with for-profit journals, it will be available in just 50% of
libraries. In particular, if a non-profit journal feels itself to be locked into dealing
with a particular commercial publisher22, it may be better off withdrawing from
the publisher’s collection sales programme, and opt instead to be distributed on
a stand-alone basis at its own chosen subscription price. In general, however, the
comparison of reach between (i) non-bundling sales and (ii) bundling with a com-
mercial publisher is ambiguous and depends on the details of the environment.23
In sum, the best outcome for a non-profit journal is to be part of a collection sales
programme, but with a non-commercial publisher which typically distributes other non-
profit journals of similar quality and which sets a price for the collection which just
allows its journals to meet their costs.
21A library’s willingness-to-pay for a given journal is θw, which is the product of two independent
U [0, 1] variables. The probability that θv is less than p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, is therefore p(1− ln p). The
profit-maximizing stand-alone price therefore maximizes p[1− p(1− ln p)], which entails p ≈ 0.28.
22For instance, the embarrassment of terminating an existing contract may be a source of inertia.
(Those involved in managing non-profit journals are seldom hardened business people.)
23For instance, suppose the fixed cost k was much higher, so that only a price close to the profit-
maximizing non-bundling price (p ≈ 0.28) could allow the journal to break-even when the journal was
sold on a stand-alone basis. Then the journal’s reach is improved (from 36% of libraries to 50%) if it is
distributed as a bundled package by a commercial publisher.
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5 Conclusions
In the past, journals were sold to libraries on a stand-alone basis, and an independent
journal usually was free to set its own subscription price. There are two main advantages
to this policy (which could still be adopted by a journal now). First, the journal has
full control over its revenues and reach. Second, there are no difficult issues to do with
how to allocate the publisher’s revenues–the journal’s contribution to overall revenue is
transparent. In such a world, a journal does not have to judge a publisher’s position on
the “exploitative–non-profit” spectrum: provided it can set its own subscription price,
a journal is (all else equal) indifferent to how its publisher otherwise deals with libraries.
Similarly, a journal does not care (all else equal) about the quality of other journals
distributed by its publisher, since a library makes its purchase decision regardless of
which other journals its buys.24
The electronic revolution means that it is essentially costless for a publisher to give
one more library access to one of its journals. As a result, is it socially efficient for all
libraries to have electronic access to all journals. Bundling acts to improve the trade-
off between revenue and reach for a journal, so that for a given level of target revenue
a journal can expand its reach if it is bundled with other journals. Bundling has the
potential to enhance profit (and reach) of for-profit journals and to expand the reach of
non-profit journals.
Current arrangements are an awkward mishmash of stand-alone and bundling ele-
ments. The price paid by a library for a collection depends on what journals it historically
took, and the extra journals are offered to the library in return for a top-up fee in addition
to the historical subscription prices. The division of this top-up fee between the partici-
pating journals is, almost inevitably, ad hoc and perceived as unfair by many journals.
Of particular concern is the potential for a commercial publisher to cross-subsidise its
own journals from the revenue generated by the independent non-profit (and often more
prestigious) journals. In addition, the reliance on historic data about library subscrip-
tions will become ever less tenable. This arrangement is unstable and will likely change
to something more sensible. In the meantime, one option for a non-profit journal is to
leave its publisher’s collection, and to return to the historic business model of stand-alone
24Similarly, a journal which participates in a publisher’s collection sales programme does not care
about the number or quality of the publisher’s journals which have chosen to remain outside the pub-
lisher’s collection.
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sales. However, this decision will deny the journal the efficiency and potential circulation
benefits involved in collection sales.
This note focussed on one (I hope, plausible) model for the medium-run evolution
of the publishing market. This model predicted: the widespread bundling of journals;
publishers bid to attract journals using lump-sum fees and promised library circulation;
non-profit journals are offered relatively little revenue in return for a wide circulation,
while for-profit journals are offered the reverse. The efficiency gains from the use of
bundling will flow into higher profits for for-profit journals (often together with higher
reach relative to a stand-alone business model), and into higher reach for non-profit
journals. The model predicts that non-profit journals of similar quality will group to-
gether in the same publisher, and the high-quality collections will have a lower price
and greater reach. (If journals of widely disparate quality were published in the same
collection, then a rival publisher could poach the higher-quality journals and offer them
a preferable revenue/reach combination.)
In the historic regime of stand-alone journal sales there was little tension when a non-
profit journal was published by a highly commercial publisher. Now, though, there is a
tension, and non-profit journals might benefit from gradually disentangling themselves
from the more commercial publishers. Both for-profit and non-profit journals, however,
should surely make full use of the powerful instrument of bundling. In particular, rel-
ative to any stand-alone sales strategy, a non-profit journal will be better off if it joins
the collection sales programme of a noncommercial publisher. The current example of
JSTOR, which distributes a collection of largely non-profit journals (with a lag), might
be a possible guide for how to disseminate the current output of non-profit journals.25
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